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Articles
United States, International

Prof. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah*

Back to the Future?
The Potential Revival of Territoriality
Since 1994, the trend in the United States and
other developed countries appears to be to
reduce the scope of residence jurisdiction and
increase the emphasis on source jurisdiction. If
this trend continues, these countries are likely to
move toward territoriality and decrease the
emphasis on their CFC rules. In the author’s
opinion, the reason for this trend is political and
economic, not legal. It is part of tax competition,
specifically the competition to be the
headquarters jurisdiction for multinationals. The
author also thinks, however, that it is not
necessary to go down this road because the
solution to the competitiveness issue is
collaboration, not more competition.
1. Introduction
Until 1993, the United States led the rest of the developed world in strengthening residence-based worldwide
corporate and individual income taxation. Already in
1937, the US adopted its first regime aimed at “incorporated pocketbooks”, or foreign corporations controlled
by five or fewer US individual taxpayers, and designed to
achieve deferral of US tax on foreign-source passive
income.1 This was followed in 1962 by the enactment of
Subpart F, which sharply curtailed deferral for controlled subsidiaries of US multinationals (CFCs).2
Between 1962 and 1993, the US expanded the scope of
Subpart F to include both passive income and other
types of income that were likely subject to low or no
source-based taxation (e.g. shipping and insurance
income).
The rest of the world followed. Germany was first in
1972, followed by Canada (1975), Japan (1978), France
(1980) and the United Kingdom (1984). By 2008, 26
countries had CFC rules, including developing countries
like Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea, Argentina and
Brazil. Moreover, many countries that traditionally had
only territorial taxation (e.g. Israel and most of Latin
America) moved to worldwide taxation of their residents. As a result, the traditional dividing line between
global and territorial jurisdictions became blurred so
that it could be said that most countries tax the foreignsource passive income of their residents, but do not tax
currently their foreign-source active income (which was
entitled to deferral or exemption).3
2. Trend to Restrict CFC rules
Since 1994, this trend seems to have been reversed, at
least in part. In the United States, the ascension of the
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Republicans in Congress from 1994 to 2006 meant a
steady stream of enactments cutting back on the scope
of Subpart F. The first step was to repeal IRC Sec. 956A
in 1994. It was enacted in 1993 and added an asset test to
the income test in Subpart F in order to prevent multinational enterprises (MNEs) from reinvesting their active
earnings in passive assets overseas instead of repatriating them as dividends to the US. Second, the passive foreign investment company rules, which were enacted in
1986 to tax the passive income of residents from foreign
corporations whether or not they were CFCs, were made
inapplicable to CFCs.4 Third, Congress enacted over
President Clinton’s veto the banking and insurance
exceptions to Subpart F, which meant that most of the
income of banks and insurance companies was exempt
because it is active, even though it can easily be earned in
low-tax jurisdictions.5 Finally and most recently, all payments from one CFC to another were exempted, even
when they are deductible and result in shifting income
from a high-tax to a low-tax jurisdiction.6
Similar developments were taking place overseas. In
Europe, the driving force was the European Court of Justice, which held in Cadbury Schweppes that the United
Kingdom may tax the profits of EU subsidiaries under
its CFC rules only if they are wholly artificial arrangements intended to escape the national tax normally
payable.7 In addition, the Supreme Administrative Court
of France held in 2002 that France’s CFC rules were
incompatible with the France–Switzerland tax treaty.8
As a result, France revised its CFC rules in 2005 to overcome the decision, resulting in a higher threshold for
their application.9
The United Kingdom reacted to Cadbury Schweppes in
2007 by unveiling a consultation document which
revealed that it was considering a significant narrowing
*

© Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 2008. Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law and
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1. The foreign personal holding company regime; see US Internal Revenue
Code (IRC) Secs. 551-558, repealed in 2004.
2. IRC Secs. 951-960.
3. Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., International Tax as International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007).
4. IRC Sec. 1297(d) (1997).
5. IRC Secs. 954(h) and (i) (1997).
6. IRC Sec. 954(c)(6) (2006).
7. Cadbury Schweppes (Case C-196/04), ECJ Doc. 2004-14844, 2004
WTD 141-7.
8. Supreme Administrative Court, 28 June 2002, No. 232276, Société
Schneider Electric, RJF 10/02, No. 1080. See Mbwa-Mboma, Marcelin, “Treaty
with Switzerland Overrides French CFC Legislation, French High Tax Court
Confirms”, 2002 WTD 127-1.
9. Goulard, Guillaume and Guillaume Jolly, “French Lawmakers Revisit
CFC Rules”, 2005 WTD 13-4.
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of its CFC rules as well as, for the first time, exempting
actual dividends paid out of the active income of UK
CFCs.10 This reform was recently put on hold because of
its cost, but it is likely to be enacted eventually.11
In the United States, the most recent development has
been the unveiling of a similar plan to exempt dividends
paid out of non-Subpart F income (i.e. active income).
The President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform
proposed in 2005 that the United States should permanently switch from taxing the parent corporation of US
multinationals on worldwide income to a modified territorial regime under which dividends paid out of active
business income were exempt from US tax.12 The Joint
Committee on Taxation made a similar recommendation.13 These recommendations follow the enactment in
2004 of a one-year reduced (5.25%) tax rate for such dividends, which resulted in the repatriation of over USD
300 billion in active earnings from CFCs of US MNEs.
Thus, there seems to be a trend to reduce the scope of
residence jurisdiction while increasing the emphasis on
source jurisdiction.14 If this trend continues, it seems
likely that both traditional territorial countries like
France and traditional worldwide countries like the
United Kingdom and the United States will move toward
territoriality and decrease the emphasis on their CFC
rules.
3. Reasons for the Trend to Source Jurisdiction
What is driving this trend? In Europe, the obvious
answer is the European Court of Justice. But this cannot
be the whole story because Cadbury Schweppes does not
require the EU Member States to eliminate CFC rules,
and it certainly does not force them to exempt foreignsource active dividends. Moreover, the trend seems to
extend beyond Europe.
The argument that CFC rules are incompatible with
Arts. 7 and 10 of the OECD Model Tax Convention has
broader application, but in my opinion (and the OECD’s
opinion), it is clearly wrong. The argument is that CFC
rules tax a foreign corporation on its foreign-source
earnings without its having a permanent establishment
in the residence jurisdiction, which arguably violates
Art. 7 (requiring no tax on business profits absent a permanent establishment) and tax a foreign corporation on
its undistributed dividends, which arguably violates Art.
10 (requiring that dividends be paid). But Art. 7 was
clearly written as a limitation on source jurisdiction, not
on residence jurisdiction. In my opinion, what CFC
rules do is redefine the residence of a CFC (i.e. make it a
resident of its parent’s residence country), and this is permissible under Art. 4.15 Once the CFC is a resident, there
is no treaty limit on the residence-based taxation of all
its income.
In my opinion, therefore, the reason for the trend to
restrict CFC rules is political and economic, not legal. It
is part of tax competition, specifically the competition to
be the headquarters jurisdiction for MNEs.
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When Daimler bought Chrysler in 1998 to form Daimler/Chrysler AG, Juergen Schrempf, the CEO of Daimler/Chrysler, testified before the US Senate Finance
Committee that Subpart F was a major reason that the
combined company was German and not American. I do
not think he was correct. The German government and
the German unions would not have tolerated a takeover
of Daimler by Chrysler, and German shareholders were
subject to tax on capital gains (if Daimler/Chrysler were
a US company), while US shareholders were not (if it
were German). In addition, Germany’s CFC rules are as
tough as Subpart F. However, Schrempf addressed a
broader phenomenon, which is that lawmakers are reasonably concerned about the impact of CFC rules on the
decision where to incorporate MNEs. In the US, this can
be shown by the trend of inversion transactions, in
which US MNEs reincorporated in Bermuda in part to
avoid Subpart F.16 The trend was stopped by legislation
in 2004, but the competitiveness issue continues.
When deciding where to establish the headquarters of a
new MNE, or of a newly merged combination of two
MNEs, it makes sense to take tax into consideration. Why
establish the parent in a jurisdiction with tough CFC
rules and a tax on dividend repatriations when the parent
can just as easily be established in a jurisdiction with no
or lax CFC rules and an exemption for dividends?
In a world in which MNEs are mobile and can shift their
headquarters (see e.g. the recent migration of Halliburton and others to Dubai) and where headquarters bring
positive externalities, it makes sense for lawmakers to
respond by relaxing CFC rules and enacting exemption
regimes.
In addition, the dividend exemption proposal makes economic sense. The basic rationale for exempting dividends
is based on Joel Slemrod’s observation that the efficiency
of a tax should be measured by the ratio between the revenue it generates and the behavioural change it induces in
taxpayers.17 In the case of the tax on dividends, it can be
demonstrated that the revenue generated is small
because, as James Hines et al. have shown, US multinationals repatriate only a small fraction of their overseas
earnings.18 On the other hand, the behavioural impact is

10. “Taxation of the foreign profits of companies”, Doc. 2007-15183, 2007
WTD 124-8.
11. “UK Government to Rethink Foreign Profit Plans”, International Tax
Review, 22 July 2008.
12. President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair, and ProGrowth: Proposals to Fix America’s Tax System (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2005), at 102-105.
13. Joint Committee on Taxation, Options to Improve Tax Compliance and
Reform Tax Expenditures (2005), at 186-197.
14. See Sheppard, Lee, “Revenge of the Source Countries”, 2006 TNT 200-3
(17 October 2006).
15. The OECD agrees with this view, as shown by the Commentary on Art 7.
See also Honda, Mitsuhiro and Hugh J. Ault, “Japanese CFC Rules Consistent
with Treaty, Court Holds”, 2008 WTD 50-9 (13 March 2008).
16. See Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., “For Haven’s Sake: Reflections on Inversion
Transactions, 95 Tax Notes 1793 (17 June 2002).
17. Slemrod, Joel, “A General Model of the Behavioral Response to Taxation”, 8 International Tax and Public Finance, No. 2 (March 2001), at 119-128.
18. Hines, Jr., James R., M.A. Desai and C.F. Foley, “Dividend Policy Inside
the Multinational Firm”, 36 Financial Management, No. 1 (2007), at 5-26.
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large, as can be seen from the data of Hines et al. (presumably, a major reason why US multinationals do not
repatriate earnings is the tax on dividends) and even
more vividly from the behavioural response to the oneyear partial amnesty of the dividend repatriation tax
enacted in 2004, which (as noted above) resulted in over
USD 300 billion in income being repatriated.
4. Problems with the Trend to Source
Jurisdiction
This trend has its attendant problems as well. The main
argument against the US dividend exemption proposal
is that, like any move in the direction of territoriality, it
puts more pressure on the source rules and on transfer
pricing. Currently, US multinationals are constrained in
their willingness to shift income from the US to foreign
jurisdictions by the knowledge that to get it back into the
US a price will have to be paid in the form of the dividend tax. The same data cited above show that this constraint is real and that the phenomenon of “trapped
income” is significant. If the US now abolishes the tax on
repatriation, it should be expected that US multinationals will have every incentive to shift even more income
overseas.
This issue would not be so problematic if the US transfer
pricing regime worked adequately to prevent income
shifting. But as Kim Clausing and I have shown, the current system is woefully inadequate to prevent income
shifting.19 This can be shown, for example, by considering Table 2 in George Yin’s article, which shows high concentrations of earnings and profits (E&P) in the Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland and Luxembourg.20 Or
consider the data in Figure 1, which shows the top ten
locations of profits of US multinationals in 2003.21
Figure 1: Where were the profits in 2003?
(profits as a percentage of the worldwide total)

In a world in which a third of the foreign profits of USbased multinationals are in countries with an effective
tax rate of less than 10%, it seems dangerous to increase
the incentive to shift profits by removing the one real
disincentive to do so – the knowledge that repatriation
will bear tax.
Yin recognized that this is a real problem and stated that
“one modification Congress should consider is to
require exempt income to be subject to tax somewhere”.22 The question is how to achieve this goal, which
I fully support as being consistent with what I call the
“single tax principle”.23 Yin proposed that a good proxy
would be to apply the dividend exemption only with
respect to countries with which the US has a tax treaty.
However, this would include many jurisdictions with
very low effective tax rates (see Yin’s Table 2, which
includes Austria, Barbados, Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland). Of the top ten
destinations in Figure 1, only two (Bermuda and the UK
Islands) would not qualify for an exemption under this
modification.
Therefore, I believe that if we are to adopt the exemption
proposal, we must condition it on the actual effective tax
rate in the source jurisdiction being high enough (e.g.
90% of the US rate). This is consistent with what the
United States’ trading partners do, as well as with the
original intent of Subpart F.24 In my opinion, this condition does not pose insuperable administrability obstacles since US multinationals already have to report both
their current E&P and the actual tax paid by each CFC
(see Yin’s Table 2). It is similar to the “franking” mechanism employed by countries with dividend imputation
systems which requires that it be shown that exempt dividends are paid out of income that was in fact subject to
a corporate-level tax.
Another question, however, is whether the US and other
jurisdictions need to go down this road at all. The
answer, I believe, is no. The solution to the competitiveness issue is collaboration, not more competition.
5. Overcoming the Competitiveness Issue
This year marks the tenth anniversary of the OECD
report on curbing harmful tax competition, in which the
OECD Member countries bound themselves to “ensure
that [CFC rules] apply in a fashion consistent with the
desirability of curbing harmful tax practices”.25 Harmful

Country

Effective tax rate (%)

Netherlands
Ireland
Bermuda
United Kingdom
Luxembourg
Canada
Switzerland
Germany
UK Islands
Japan

5.3
6.1
1.7
20.1
– 1.8
23.5
4.5
8.2
1.3
36.9
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19. Avi-Yonah, Reuven and Kimberly Clausing, Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment (The
Hamilton Project, Brookings Institution, 2007); also in 2007 TNT 114-38 (13
June 2007).
20. Yin, George K., “Reforming the Taxation of Foreign Direct Investment
by US Taxpayers”, 2008 TNT 5-22 (8 January 2008).
21. Avi-Yonah and Clausing, supra note 19, Figure 2.
22. Yin, supra note 20.
23. Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., “Tax Competition, Tax Arbitrage and the International Tax Regime”, Bulletin for International Taxation 4 (2007), at 130.
24. Avi-Yonah, Reuven, “U.S. Notice 98-11 and the Logic of Subpart F: A
Comparative Perspective”, Tax Notes International (8 June 1998).
25. OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (1998),
at 40-41.
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tax practices are defined to include tax holidays targeted
at foreign investors.26
If this recommendation is taken seriously, it means that
it should be possible to combat deferral in a coordinated
fashion, thus overcoming the competitiveness issue. The
United States was the traditional leader in restricting
deferral and, as noted above, other countries have followed. The OECD report makes it very likely that if the
United States were to move now to restrict or even repeal
deferral, other OECD countries would also tighten their
anti-deferral rules, just as they did in the 1970s in
response to Subpart F. Since 85% of all multinationals
are based in OECD countries, such a coordinated move
by the OECD would effectively solve the competitiveness issue (because all the competitors of a US-based
MNE would be subject to the same anti-deferral rules as
the US-based MNE).
On the other hand, if the United States were to adopt an
exemption regime now, as the President’s Advisory Panel
recommended, this would in all likelihood lead other
OECD countries to expand deferral as well, despite the
OECD report. We are thus in a classic prisoners’
dilemma situation, but one that can be successfully
resolved because of the availability of the OECD as a
coordinating institution through which countries can
credibly commit to limit their deferral or exemption
regimes.
Advocates of deferral may doubt that the OECD would
actually be able to achieve the coordinated action
needed to curtail deferral and support the single tax
principle. There is, however, a well-known example in
which the OECD was successfully used to overcome
such a prisoners’ dilemma. In 1977, the United States
unilaterally enacted a draconian set of rules applicable
to US-based MNEs, which drastically limited their ability to obtain projects abroad by bribing local officials.
The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act made such
behaviour subject to criminal prosecution as well as to
tax penalties. This predictably led to an outcry by USbased MNEs that their competitive position would
become untenable because of their inability to follow
local corrupt practices, while their foreign-based competitors faced no such impediments (Germany, in fact,
allowed a tax deduction for documented bribes).
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The result was a prolonged drive by the United States to
get other OECD countries to commit to enact similar
tough laws. This drive finally culminated in the 1990s in
the OECD anti-corruption treaty, which anecdotal evidence suggests has already had a major impact in removing the competitive disadvantage facing US-based
MNEs.
Of course, there is an important difference between
bribes and taxes: both are costs from an MNE’s perspective, but from the government’s perspective (and this
applies even to governments in countries plagued by
corruption), bribes are to be prohibited while taxes are
to be collected. Thus, MNEs themselves supported the
OECD anti-corruption effort, which enabled them to
avoid paying bribes for fear of competition, while they
were less supportive of the anti-tax competition initiative, which would curtail their ability to avoid taxation.
However, the basic prisoners’ dilemma is the same, and
there is therefore no reason why the OECD should not
enable countries to advance the global goal of eliminating double non-taxation by limiting or even eliminating
deferral without impairing the competitiveness of “their”
MNEs. Thus, the right answer to the competitiveness
issue is for the new US administration to push its allies
in the OECD Forum on Harmful Tax Practices to act in
a coordinated fashion to tighten their anti-deferral rules.
The anti-corruption example shows that such a push has
a good chance of succeeding under current conditions.
Even if all the OECD countries adopted strict anti-deferral rules, this would still leave the door open to reincorporating in non-OECD countries and to forming new
companies in them. At the present time, few corporations are willing to reincorporate in non-OECD countries because of the likely loss of some shareholder protections and other reputational concerns. If, however,
reincorporating or forming new MNEs in non-OECD
countries becomes a significant trend, this may require
further action by the OECD to protect the corporate tax
base.27

26. Id. at 27.
27. See IRC Sec. 7874, enacted in 2004 to stop US-based MNEs from moving to Bermuda.
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